Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev.
Syria’s interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa arrived in Azerbaijan on Saturday for his first official visit to the country since taking office earlier this year. Carefully choreographed and heavily publicised, the visit casts a spotlight on Azerbaijan’s ambitious plans to expand its influence beyond the South Caucasus.
In the wake of its 2020 military victory in the second Karabakh war and the subsequent expulsion of indigenous Armenians from the disputed territories, Baku has confidently begun carving a larger role for itself across the Middle East.
Its newest front is Syria. Azerbaijan’s outreach to Damascus is part of a wider, calculated strategy designed to deepen energy partnerships and present itself as a reliable mediator in a region undergoing realignment. It is also part of a long game aiming to strengthen ties with Israel, leverage regional instability to its advantage and expand influence well beyond the boundaries of the Caucasus.
Under Bashar al-Assad, Syria closely aligned with Armenia, reflecting historical ties tracing back to the Armenian genocide of 1915. Deeply integrated into the Syrian economy, society and the military establishment, over 80,000 Armenians lived there prior to the outbreak of the civil war in 2011. In 2020, Syria was one of the few Arab states to officially recognise the Armenian genocide. Assad’s government openly supported Armenia during the Karabakh conflicts, with Baku alleging Syrian arms transfers facilitated Armenia’s war efforts. Meanwhile, Syrian opposition mercenaries were reportedly enlisted by Azerbaijan to fight on the frontlines in Karabakh.
Assad’s ouster in December 2024 marked a tectonic shift in foreign alignments. Transitional leader Sharaa signalled a break from Assad-era policies by seeking rapprochement with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan quickly seized the opportunity, dispatching humanitarian aid in late 2024.
On 14 February 2025, Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev sent a congratulatory letter to Sharaa, emphasising ‘great opportunities for elevating relations’ and extending an invitation for a state visit. It reopened its embassy in Syria after a 13-year hiatus, and by April 2025, Azerbaijani delegations were already in Damascus discussing energy cooperation and reconstruction support.
Energy is Baku’s primary currency. A tangible outcome of Sharaa’s visit to Baku was the memorandum of understanding signed between Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR and the Syrian government for Azerbaijani natural gas supply. This expanding energy role is key, as the Middle East seeks post-conflict reconstruction with secure energy infrastructure, a sector in which Azerbaijan aims to outflank rivals.
More broadly, Azerbaijan’s Syria strategy aligns closely with Israeli regional designs. According to a diplomatic source in Damascus, as reported by Haaretz, Syrian and Israeli officials were set to hold direct talks in Baku on the sidelines of Sharaa’s visit.
Israeli diplomacy, backed by US interests, seeks to recalibrate Middle Eastern alliances by weakening Iranian influence and isolating Armenia, an Iranian ally. Discussions about lifting remaining US sanctions on Sharaa’s transitional government, normalisation between Israel and Syria and the possibility of Azerbaijan joining the Abraham Accords collectively represent a larger Israeli-backed effort to reconfigure the region.
Baku’s involvement in Syria under this new order serves as a piece in this broader geopolitical puzzle, presenting Azerbaijan as a potential Sunni-Shia bridge and a loyal regional partner, reducing Iran’s sway and fracturing the old axis of Russia-Iran-Armenia. As one analyst put it: ‘Baku seeks more than just military muscle. Its ties to Tel Aviv serve as a political wedge in Washington, undercutting Armenian influence. For Israel, showcasing a strategic alliance with a Muslim-majority, nominally Shia republic is a prized propaganda asset – bolstering its narrative of coexistence with the Islamic world.’
However, this ambition will meet challenges. Unlike entrenched regional powers, such as Iran, Turkey or Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan lacks long-standing religious, political and cultural footholds in the Middle East. Its size, relative lack of economic heft and its competitive disadvantage in a crowded energy market makes Baku’s aspirations likely unattainable.
Its military capabilities are limited, and its forays to Syria risk antagonising Tehran which has long eyed Azerbaijan’s ties to Israel with suspicion, accusing Baku of permitting Israeli drone operations from its territory during the 12-day war in June—a claim Azerbaijan denies. The Syrian dimension adds complexity: during the 2020 Karabakh war, Azerbaijan (with Turkish backing) deployed Syrian Salafist fighters against Armenia. Iran warned it would not tolerate such extremists near its borders.
Azerbaijan’s deeper dilemma is balancing its alliances with Turkey and Israel, whose interests in Syria increasingly clash. Turkey sees Syria as its area of influence and opposes Israeli entrenchment; Israel is escalating its encroachments in the south of Syria. The Tel Aviv–Ankara friction over Syria may be a harbinger of dynamics to come. With Tehran’s influence on the wane, Israel increasingly sees Turkey as its new regional peer competitor.
For Azerbaijan to frame itself as a bridge between these Middle East powers is likely a significant overreach. Neutrality won’t hold forever and Azerbaijan may be forced to choose between Ankara and Tel Aviv, imperilling its hard-cultivated partnerships. Moreover, while Baku may aspire to a role like that played by Doha, Azerbaijan has few of its advantages. Azerbaijan’s GDP per capita is one-tenth of Qatar’s, it has none of the Gulf state’s geographic importance, nor does it have comparable military importance or a significant American military presence.
Azerbaijan’s grand ambitions face other significant hurdles. Syria’s post-war reconstruction remains fragile and contested. US President Donald Trump lifted sanctions on Syria and seeks to be a major partner of Damascus in the future. Moreover, the US’s cautious approach to normalising relations with Damascus and concerns about transitional leaders’ past links to al-Qaida and other extremist groups, as well as their failure (or refusal) to stem the tide of violence against Christians and Alawites, complicate international backing. On top of this, Russian influence may be diminished but not extinguished. These factors temper expectations about Azerbaijan’s swift rise as a Middle East power broker.
Azerbaijan’s expanding foreign policy post-Karabakh war is more than just regional repositioning. Through energy diplomacy and political mediation, Baku seeks to secure a seat at the table of the Middle East’s future order, one increasingly shaped by Israel’s pursuit of regional hegemony.
While a visit by Sharaa to Azerbaijan may be newsworthy, Syria is a crowded country and the Middle East is a crowded neighbourhood. Aside from the regional heavyweights, China, the US, Russia and the Europeans also have longstanding influence in the region. Azerbaijan’s challenge will be not only to show up but to be taken seriously as a new player on the complex, evolving chessboard of Middle Eastern politics.