On May 13, 2025, the government of Mali, citing “public order,” outlawed and dissolved all political parties. Since taking power, following two army coups in 2020 and 2021, interim President Assimi Goïta’s politics have been marked by strong nationalist rhetoric. Goïta has positioned himself as a defender of Mali’s sovereignty, pushing back against foreign influence and redirecting Mali’s foreign policy away from traditional allies. Significantly, France was obliged to withdraw its Barkhane army forces from Mali in February 2022. But the Malian ruling military junta went even further when it pushed out the UN’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and put an end to the 2015 Algiers Accord.
In place of these alliances, security assistance has increasingly been provided by Russia’s paramilitary Africa Corps, formerly known as the Wagner Group, as well as by Morocco. The latter is aggressively more present in the Sahel region, offering closer partnerships and economic cooperation with Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, the three countries of the Alliance of Sahel States. Rabat is luring these landlocked states into a project that promises to provide access to the Atlantic Ocean through the occupied territory of Western Sahara.
In addition to these new alliances, Goïta has also claimed to tackle corruption and restructure Mali’s institutions to rally support from the Malian population. Such populist discourses and maneuvers appeal to numerous Malians who are tired of elite impunity and government inefficiency. Indeed Goïta’s promises resonated with many Malians frustrated by years of foreign military presence, poor security and economic conditions. Yet, there have been no significant improvements to any of the above since Goita took power four years ago. Since February 2022, the transitional government has repeatedly delayed elections, citing “technical reasons” and eventually proposed a presidential term extension until 2030. There are rising concerns about Goita’s authoritarian style, particularly after he promoted himself to the rank of general in 2024.
The postponement of elections was the immediate trigger that sparked demonstrations by opposition political parties in early May. Rather than acknowledging demands for a return to constitutional order by December 2025, the government quickly issued a ban on all political parties.
The political crisis has economic roots. Despite numerous promises from Goïta’s government, living conditions for most Malians remain dire, with the economic growth being largely concentrated in urban areas and major cities, and rural areas remaining neglected. For example, the ratio of GNP between urban and rural areas is 5.5% in Mali and sub-Saharan Africa globally, compared to only 2.7% in India. Meanwhile, corruption in Mali is rampant. After taking power, the junta was quick to point out the deep corruption present in the different governing circles, promising to rapidly tackle the problem. However, to date, poverty has increased, and Malians are struggling to survive. A nouveau riche is emerging, as new houses for the colonels have recently “sprung up like mushrooms.” One member of the junta, Colonel Sadio Camara, allegedly feeds several horses in his yard where there are two stables.
The latest events in Mali are likely to bring not only further political instability but also provide impetus to armed and militant jihadist groups active across the country. Indeed, this latest step from the military authorities in Bamako is likely to spark deep discontent among the population, and will undoubtedly encourage more youth to join militant groups present in Mali and in the Sahel region, as well as further southwest on the continent. Such groups are already on the attack; one such attack, in April in Benin, saw the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) kill at least 54 soldiers in the north of the country. Although militant groups point out the economic failure and political shortcomings of the Sahelian states, the presence of foreign powers in the Sahel region has made things worse. European states such as France and Germany have on different occasions paid ransoms to liberate their citizens kidnapped in the region, yet they have contributed to financing militant groups in the Sahel. The presence of France’s military forces from 2013 provided fertile ground for both extremist groups and a large fringe of the Malian population, which the Malian military junta exploited in their quest for legitimacy following their 2020 coup.
Jihadist groups such as JNIM and ISIS-Sahel will have no difficulty in further pointing out the failure of Goïta, convincing more Malians to join their ranks. These groups largely capitalize on socioeconomic grievances to recruit members and legitimize their control of villages and regions that the central authorities of Bamako have been unable to govern for years.
Meanwhile, the increasing use of the internet provider Starlink will facilitate further recruitment, with technology reaching people living in remote places. It is publicly known that militant groups in Mali and in the Sahel in general, are already exploiting Starlink to enhance their operational capabilities. Starlink will also perpetuate organized crime, which is already well-rooted in the Sahel. The black market in Mali and the Sahel in general facilitates an illicit supply chain through which devices such as Starlink can be obtained.
In providing a mobile and easy-to-use communication tool, militant groups will have little difficulty recruiting many Malians who live in isolated rural regions. These populations will increasingly fall prey to extremist discourses that also point out the failures of the state.
After forcing Barkhane and MINUSMA to leave Mali, divorcing ECOWAS and declaring the Algiers Accord dead, Bamako has turned to new friends and allies such as Africa Corps, the United Arab Emirates, and Morocco. However, and as the former US national security adviser, John Bolton, noted, Morocco’s [regional] territorial aspirations do not include only Western Sahara but also large portions of northern Mauritania and western Algeria. Undoubtedly, Morocco’s territorial aspirations should be a warning to Bamako.
Meanwhile, acute economic development, insecurity linked to terrorism and organized crime remain entrenched in the Malian socio-political and economic landscape. And neither the Malian army nor Goïta’s new allies have so far been able to address these issues. There is no doubt that the latest move from Goïta will only fuel this insecurity, putting the entire Sahel-Maghreb region at a higher risk of instability.